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A New Approach to the Issue of Medical 
Futility: Reframing the Debate 
Sophie Kasimow 
 
 The 1960s saw the birth of the newest field in 
the ethics of healthcare and the biomedical sciences: 
bioethics.  The revolutionary technological advances 
during this and the following decades – including the 
creation and widespread use of dialysis machines, 
artificial ventilators, in vitro fertilization, modern 
contraception, and organ transplants – created new 
ethical problems that had never before been 
encountered.  As these technologies developed, people 
began asking questions about their proper use.  With the 
new capacity to keep the bodies of “dead” patients 
working for days, months, or even years, bioethicists 
had new dilemmas on their hands.  By the 1980s, 
physicians began to identify that they could maintain 
physiological processes of life but not reverse existing 
bodily damage.  In an increasing number of patients, 
doctors felt they were prolonging death with 
nonbeneficial or even harmful treatments.1  This issue 
of medical futility has become a growing problem for 
hospitals; in the United States alone it is estimated that 
there are currently 14,000-35,000 people in a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS), and this number does not 
include the potentially thousands of other patients who 
are comatose but do not meet the recognized criteria for 
brain death.2   
                                                
 
1 Gay Moldow, Dianne Bartels, Don Brunnquell, and Ron 
Cranford, “Why Address Medical Futility Now?,” Minnesota 
Medicine (June 2004), 38.  
2 The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS.  “Medical Aspects of the 
Persistent Vegetative State: First of Two Parts,” New England 
Journal of Medicine, vol. 330 (1994), 1499-1508. 
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In this paper I will lay out the foundation of the 
medical futility debate, using Mark Wicclair’s article, 
“Medical Futility: A Conceptual and Ethical Analysis,” 
published in Biomedical Ethics, by Thomas Mappes 
and David DeGrazia.3  After discussing some of the 
concerns that arise with the available literature on the 
futility conversation, I will develop my own working 
definition for medical futility.  After reading this paper, 
I hope that doctors and bioethicists will gain a greater 
understanding of the difficulties of declaring a 
treatment futile, as well as improve their ability to 
consider the ethical questions raised throughout the 
treatment of a dying patient.  
 The word “futility” comes from the Latin word 
for leaky (futilis), and can be found in ancient texts 
such as the Greek myth of the daughters of Danaus who 
were condemned for eternity in Hades to draw water in 
leaky buckets.  A futile action, as exemplified in this 
story, is one that will never achieve the goals of the 
action, no matter for how long or how often it is 
repeated.4  To deem a medical treatment futile requires 
considerable clarification. 
 In order to understand the idea of medical 
futility, it is important to recognize the difference 
between futility and impossibility.  For example, it is 
physically impossible to restart a heart if the person 
does not have enough blood in their body.  Futility is 
also often confused with extremely complex acts that 
are implausible, though perhaps theoretically possible.  
For example, though it is conceivably possible, it is 
currently too complicated for humans to produce a baby 
                                                
3 Mark R. Wicclair, “Medical Futility: A Conceptual and Ethical 
Analysis,” in Thomas A. Mappes and David DeGrazia, Biomedical 
Ethics, 4th Ed. (New York, USA: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1996), 346.  
4 Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Nancy S. Jecker, and Albert R. 
Jonsen, “Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications,” 
Annals of Internal Medicine, vol. 112 (June 1990), 950. 
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entirely outside of the womb. 5   It should also be 
clarified that a futile action is not futile on the basis of 
its rarity or unusualness, such as the highly unlikely 
success of returning to health a mentally impaired drug 
addict with bacterial endocarditis (an infection of the 
heart).  Rather, an action is futile because it will fail in 
its goals.  These are often difficult distinctions to make 
as medical cases become increasingly complicated, and 
it will be useful to refer to them later if the need for 
clarification arises.  
 Since the beginning of the futility debate, 
doctors and ethicists have been dividing out the 
necessary conditions of futility in different ways.  Mark 
Wicclair presents the idea that futility has three 
different senses: 1) Physiological futility, 2) Futility in 
relation to the patient’s goals, and 3) Futility in relation 
to standards of professional integrity.6  
 Physiological futility is the aspect of futility that 
asserts that certain medical interventions will not 
achieve their medical goals.  Under this sense of futility, 
an action such as tube-feeding is futile if it will not 
succeed in providing sustaining nutrition.  In this type 
of case, those with the greatest clinical expertise 
(doctors) will be the ones most likely to know the 
effects of a medical intervention, and whether or not 
that intervention will achieve the desired medical 
outcome.7 
 Several concerns arise when considering the 
idea of physiological futility.  First, though doctors may 
understand whether the outcome will be successful, 
determining whether the outcome is an appropriate 
                                                
5 Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Nancy S. Jecker, and Albert R. 
Jonsen, “Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications,” 
Annals of Internal Medicine, vol. 112 (June 1990), 950. 
6 Mark R. Wicclair, “Medical Futility: A Conceptual and Ethical 
Analysis,” in Biomedical Ethics, 4th Ed., 346.  
7 Ibid., 347.  
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objective in the first place requires value judgments that 
go beyond the scope of their position.  A doctor could 
consider that surgery X will not prevent further illness 
nor reduce pain and so is medically futile, while the 
patient may have other objectives in mind and so desire 
the surgery.  Some types of cosmetic surgery may raise 
this objection, for example.  Secondly, doctors may 
decide that a treatment is medically futile based on their 
expertise in relation to a standard of reasonableness, 
such as reasonable past success of that treatment.  
Again, a value judgment is required when deciding 
what constitutes a “reasonable” chance of success.  
Additionally, certain treatments cause benefits and 
negative effects simultaneously, and it is difficult to 
create a guide for handling these borderline cases.  
 The second sense in which medical futility is 
categorized by Wicclair is the idea that a treatment is 
futile if it will not achieve the goals of the patient. 8   
While physicians can help the patient clarify his or her 
goals, perhaps through an explanation of physiological 
processes, they cannot choose which goals a patient 
should hold.  When a doctor understands the goals of 
the patient, he or she can present the patient with the 
best possible options for continuing care.  Does the 
patient wish to undergo a painful procedure with a low 
likelihood of success, or is the goal of the patient to 
have a potentially shorter, but less painful life?  The 
patient must be asked if the treatment is, in their 
opinion, “worth the effort.” 
There are two major problems with this aspect 
of futility.  First, patients and/or their surrogates may 
disagree with the doctor’s opinion regarding the 
probability of achieving their goal through the 
treatment in discussion.  The patient may feel they are 
healthy and of a strong mind and so will “beat the 
                                                
8 Ibid., 348.  
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odds.”  Secondly, even if the doctor and patient agree 
on the probability of the treatment being a success, they 
may disagree on whether that percentage is worth the 
risk.  Patients often desire treatments despite their poor 
odds.  From personal experience, I have found that 
when a patient is faced with doing nothing or doing 
something that has a low probability of success, if the 
treatment is bearable they will generally desire to give 
it a try.  This objection returns us to one of the 
objections to physiological futility; namely, that 
deciding what can be categorized as a “reasonable” 
probability, success, or outcome is a personal value 
judgment.   
 Wicclair’s third division of medical futility, 
futility in relation to standards of professional integrity, 
addresses the idea that a treatment is futile if there is no 
reasonable chance it will achieve any goals that are 
consistent with the rules of professional integrity.  
Though I find this measurement of “professional 
integrity” more ambiguous and difficult to explain than 
the first two divisions of futility, Wicclair is trying to 
get at the idea that there are proper goals of medicine 
and appropriate uses of certain medical interventions.  
Physicians must maintain the integrity of their 
discipline by using treatments sensibly.  These 
standards prevent doctors from providing services that 
are contrary to the standards of other physicians.  A 
doctor could argue that providing CPR for a patient 
with heart failure is futile because the patient has a less 
than 1 percent chance of surviving long enough to leave 
the hospital.  While the patient may request CPR in 
case of cardiopulmonary arrest, the doctor may claim 
that providing CPR is a misuse of the treatment, and 
that providing that treatment would violate the doctor’s 
professional integrity.  In cases where professional 
integrity indicates a treatment may be futile, what 
specific aspect of integrity is being cited?  Is the doctor 
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using his or her own personal standards regarding CPR 
or widely accepted standards?  
 These questions raise, once again, the same 
problem of relativism that the other two aspects of 
futility face.  Wicclair argues that futility judgments 
using this third sense are only justified if they are 
legitimate standards within the medical profession.  
While certain standards can be discussed in advance, a 
large portion of the discussions in cases of medical 
futility is a discussion of quality of life and is different 
for each individual patient and their family.  If we 
accept this qualitative component to the discussion of 
medical futility, which I do accept, then “why should 
the patient not always decide whether the quality 
achieved is satisfactory or not? Why should 
qualitatively “futile” results not be offered to the patient 
as an option?”9  This is a contentious subject in the 
medical futility literature; doctors declaring a treatment 
futile has been construed as medical professionals 
asserting their power over the autonomy of the patient.  
This perspective, that the autonomy of the physician 
supercedes the autonomy of the patient, is based on the 
idea that doctors and patients are involved in a 
continuing power-struggle for control, with doctors 
having the upper hand.  Declaring a treatment futile is 
not a “trump card” in this relationship, but rather a 
necessary part of the physician’s duty of beneficence.  
Futility must not be declared arbitrarily, but rather 
established within the medical discipline to preserve 
professional standards.10  When everything has been 
done and a patient is dying, through further treatment 
                                                
9 Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Nancy S. Jecker, and Albert R. 
Jonsen, “Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications,” 
952. 
10 Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Nancy S. Jecker, and Albert R. 
Jonsen, “Medical Futility: Response to Critiques,” Annals of 
Internal Medicine, vol. 125 (15 October 1996), 670. 
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may be declared futile, continuing palliative care is 
never futile.11 
 Using Wicclair’s divisions of futility as a 
guideline, I propose this working definition of medical 
futility:  A treatment should be considered futile if it 
will not be beneficial to the physiological or 
psychological health of the patient.  This definition 
states that a treatment is futile if it will not solve the 
medical problem, and also incorporates the idea that a 
treatment may not be futile if the treatment is important 
the patient’s goals.  Acknowledging that it is possible 
for an individual to have goals that are non-health 
promoting, the idea of treatment promoting a patient’s 
“psychological health” is based on the rational that a 
mentally healthy and competent adult will not generally 
desire treatment that is deleterious to their health.  The 
patient may desire treatment that will prolong their life 
at a quality that may not be seen as particularly 
desirable, but most patients are motivated to continue 
further treatment to prolong their healthy life, not 
prolong a life in PVS, for example.  This assumption 
may be challenged, though the risks of defining futility 
solely in terms of a patient’s goals and desires raise 
many additional ethical challenges, some of which I 
have raised in this paper.  
My definition excludes Wicclair’s notion of 
professional integrity because it is even more arbitrary 
than what may arguably be seen as a definition that is 
too vague to be useful.  If the medical team could gain a 
better understanding of the patient and/or their family’s 
reasoning, perhaps the lines of communication would 
be more productive.  A mutually acceptable decision 
might be easier to reach; patients and families would 
feel less powerless to get what they need, and the 
                                                
11 Dianne Bartels. Minnesota Center for Bioethics, MN.  
Conversation, 2004.  
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doctors would feel less conflicted about providing care 
that they feel is futile or unethical.  
 Patients and families who must make treatment 
decisions when the case is deemed futile – meaning that 
the treatment will not benefit the patient either 
physiologically or psychologically – have a difficult 
task and many emotions to balance.  As medicine 
continues to advance, and patients are revived from 
progressively more dire conditions, it will become 
increasingly important to understand the concepts 
central to the medical futility discussion.   
 
